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Abstract: This paper gives an overview of good and bad practice for understanding and curbing 
cost overrun in large capital investment projects, with a critique of Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui 
(2018) as point of departure. Good practice entails: (a) Consistent definition and measurement 
of overrun; in contrast to mixing inconsistent baselines, price levels, etc. (b) Data collection that 
includes all valid and reliable data; as opposed to including idiosyncratically sampled data, data 
with removed outliers, non-valid data from consultancies, etc. (c) Recognition that cost overrun 
is systemically fat-tailed; in contrast to understanding overrun in terms of error and 
randomness. (d) Acknowledgment that the root cause of cost overrun is behavioral bias; in 
contrast to explanations in terms of scope changes, complexity, etc. (e) De-biasing cost estimates 
with reference class forecasting or similar methods based in behavioral science; as opposed to 
conventional methods of estimation, with their century-long track record of inaccuracy and 
systemic bias. Bad practice is characterized by violating at least one of these five points. Love 
and Ahiaga-Dagbui violate all five. In so doing, they produce an exceptionally useful and 
comprehensive catalog of the many pitfalls that exist, and must be avoided, for properly 
understanding and curbing cost overrun. 
 
Five Key Questions about Cost Overrun 
Cost overrun in large capital investment projects can be hugely damaging, incurring outsize 
losses on investors and tax payers, compromising chief executives and their organizations, and 
even leading to bankruptcy (Flyvbjerg et al. 2009, Flyvbjerg and Budzier 2011). Accordingly, 
cost overrun receives substantial attention in both the professional literature and popular 
media. Yet it is not always clear how cost overrun is defined, why it happens, and how to best 
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avoid it, which has led to misperceptions about the concept with policy makers, planners, 
investors, academics, and the public. To help remedy this situation, below we address five 
fundamental questions about cost overrun in large capital investment projects: 
 
1. What is cost overrun, and how is it measured? 
2. Which data are used to establish cost overrun? 
3. What is the size and frequency of cost overrun? 
4. What are the root causes of cost overrun? 
5. How is cost overrun best avoided? 
 
If your job is to research, plan, finance, or deliver large capital projects, you need to have good 
answers to these questions. Here, we answer the questions in a response to Love and Ahiaga-
Dagbui (2018), invited by the editors.16 We appreciate this opportunity to clarify what good and 
bad practice is in understanding and curbing cost overrun, and the many pitfalls that exist for 
good practice, eminently exemplified by Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui. 
 We are delighted that Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui acknowledge that our work on cost 
underestimation, "Undeniably ... has made an impact ... [and] brought to attention issues that ǤǤǤǮǯǡ ?ey say 
(p. YY).17 To understand and deal with the "elephant in the room" Ȃ deliberate and non-
deliberate cost underestimation in large capital investment projects Ȃ has been a core purpose 
of our work. For Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui to recognize that we have succeeded is gratifying, and 
we thank them for their acknowledgement.  
 Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui, however, are critical of our work. We welcome their objections, 
as criticism is the main mechanism for securing high levels of validity and reliability in 
scholarship. But we are surprised by the language used by Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui in 
communicating their commentary. For instance, they describe our research findings as "fake 
news", "myths" (no less than 15 times), "canards", "factoids", "flagrant", "rhetoric", 
"misinformation", and more (p. YY). We are further accused of having "fooled many people" by 
having "been just as crafty as Machiavelli" as we "have feigned and dissembled information" 
through our research (p. YY). As a factual observation, in our entire careers we have never come 
across language in an academic journal like that used by Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui. We suggest 
such language has no place in academic discourse.  
 In what follows, we address Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui's critique by relating it to each of 
the five key questions about cost overrun listed above. 
 
1. What Is Cost Overrun, and How Is It Measured? 
Cost overrun is the amount by which actual cost exceeds estimated cost, with cost measured in 
the local currency, constant prices, and against a consistent baseline. Overrun is typically 
measured in percent of estimated cost, with a positive value indicating cost overrun and a 
negative value underrun. Size, frequency, and distribution of cost overrun should all be 
measured as part of measuring cost overrun for a certain investment type. 
 
Cost overrun is the difference between actual and estimated capital costs for an investment. The 
difference may be measured in absolute or relative terms. In absolute terms cost overrun is 
                                                             
16 ///Note to the editor and copy editor: The version of Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui (2018) we have read 
contains many errors and oddities of language. We have marked these with "[sic]." To the extent the 
errors and oddities are eliminated before publication the "sic"s should be eliminated, too./// 
17 ///Note to the editor and copy editor: Kindly insert correct page numbers instead of "YY" for all quotes 
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measured as actual minus estimated cost.18 In relative terms overrun is measured as either (a) 
actual cost in percent of estimated cost, or (b) the ratio of actual divided by estimated cost. In 
our studies, we measure cost overrun in relative terms, because this makes for accurate 
comparison across investments, geographies, and time periods. It also makes for accuracy in 
forecasts of cost risk. 
 Estimated cost may be, and typically is, established at different time points Ȃ or baselines Ȃ in the investment and delivery cycle, e.g., at the outline business case, final business case, and 
contracting. The cost estimate will normally be different at different time points, and it typically 
becomes more accurate the closer to final delivery the investment is, although there may be 
large variations in this, for instance where bad news about cost overruns are hidden as long as 
possible and cost estimates therefore suddenly explode when the project is well into delivery, 
when the overruns can no longer be kept secret, which is not an uncommon occurrence for large 
capital investment projects.  
 The baseline one chooses for measuring cost overrun depends on what one wants to 
understand and measure. We want to understand whether decision makers make well-informed 
decisions. For cost, this means we want to know whether the cost estimate on the basis of which 
decision makers decide to go ahead with a project is accurate. If the cost estimate is accurate the 
decision makers were well informed; if the estimate is inaccurate they were ill informed. We 
therefore use this cost estimate Ȃ called the budget at the time of decision to build Ȃ as baseline 
for measuring cost overrun in our studies, including Flyvbjerg et al. (2002, 2004), Cantarelli et 
al. (2010a; 2012a,b,c), Flyvbjerg et al. (2009), Flyvbjerg and Budzier (2011), Flyvbjerg (2014), 
Ansar et al. (2016, 2017), Flyvbjerg (2016), and Flyvbjerg et al. (2016).19 Love and Ahiaga-
Dagbui's critique apply to these publications because they all use the data, theory, and 
methodology first set out in Flyvbjerg et al. (2002), which is the main focus of Love and Ahiaga-
Dagbui although they also cite several of the other publications. 
 Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui object to this baseline. "The use of the budget at the decision-to-
build may lead to inflated cost overruns being propagated," they claim (p. YY). They recommend 
to use the budget at contracting as baseline instead, which would on average show a lower cost 
overrun because this baseline is placed later in the investment cycle. We maintain that the 
choice of baseline should reflect what it is you want to measure, and discuss this in detail in 
Cantarelli et al. (2010a,b). We agree that if you want to measure the performance of contractors, 
e.g., how well they deliver to the contracted budget, which seems to be Love and Ahiaga-
Dagbui's focus, then the baseline at contracting is the right choice.20 However, this is not what 
we wanted to measure in our studies. Our focus is on decision making, and hence on measuring 
                                                             
18 Actual cost is defined as real, accounted capital investment costs determined at the time of completion 
of the investment, when expenditures are known. Estimated cost is defined as budgeted, or forecasted, 
capital investment cost. Actual and estimated cost are calculated in the local currency and at the same 
price level (e.g., 2017 dollars) to ensure their comparability. Typically financing cost (e.g., interest 
payment on loans) is not included in estimated and actual capital investment cost. 
19 To be more specific, we baseline cost overrun in the budget at the time of the formal decision to build, 
i.e., the time the formal decision making body (e.g., parliament, government authority, board of directors) 
approved a project to go ahead. Often the real decision to build a project has been made much earlier, with 
a point of no return. Measured against the budget at the time of the real decision to build, cost overrun is 
typically substantially higher than when measured against the budget at the time of the formal decision to 
build, introducing a conservative bias in our findings. We cover this problematic in Cantarelli et al. 
(2010b). 
20 Similarly, if you wanted to understand how accurate cost estimates are in outline business cases, you 
would use the outline business case as baseline. Or if you wanted to understand half way through 
construction of a project how likely the remaining budget is to be sufficient, you would baseline here, as 
Flyvbjerg et al. (2014) did for Hong Kong's XRL high-speed rail project. The baseline depends on what you 
want to understand. There is not one given baseline that is right, as Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui seem to 
think. 
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the accuracy of information available to decision makers. With this focus, the budget at the time 
of making the decision to build is the right baseline for measuring cost overrun. Without this 
baseline it would be impossible to answer the important question of whether decisions are well 
informed or not regarding cost. Budgets estimated after the decision to build Ȃ like the 
contracted budget Ȃ are by definition irrelevant to this decision. Whatever the reasons are for 
inaccurate budgets, if the aim is to improve the quality of decision making then legislators, 
citizens, investors, planners, and managers must know the uncertainty of budget forecasts, 
which is what we measure in our studies. Otherwise transparency, accountability, and good 
governance will suffer. 
 We agree with Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui that cost estimates will vary, "depending on ǯ-making processes" and that, "This makes it difficult to understand and 
compare project costs between markets" (p. YY). However, we do not compare costs between 
markets, we compare percentage cost overrun. Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui's text indicate they do 
not understand the difference between comparing cost and comparing cost overrun, i.e., 
comparing an absolute versus comparing a relative value, which is fundamentally different in 
statistical terms, with comparison of relative values (percentage cost overrun) possible and 
desirable.21 
 We further agree with Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui that different technologies, funding 
mechanisms, legal systems, and environmental regulations produce substantial variations 
across jurisdictions in the cost estimating process and in cost estimates. We disagree, however, 
that this means "that undertaking any form of comparative study on the accuracy of estimated 
costs with this [Flyvbjerg et al.'s] dataset would be nonsensical" (p. YY). If the statistical model is 
properly set up, whatever factors are of interest can be compared, and the differences present 
opportunities to study the influence on cost overrun of dissimilarities in technology, funding 
mechanisms, etc. The differences are possible explanations of differences in cost overrun, and 
we study them as such, e.g., in Flyvbjerg et al. (2004) and Cantarelli and Flyvbjerg (2015), as do 
others (Pickrell 1990, Fouracre et al. 1990, Terrill et al. 2016, Welde and Odeck 2017). 
 Finally, we agree with Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui that "no international standards exist to 
determine the level of detail needed to formulate an estimate at the time the decision-to-build is 
made" (p. YY). An international standard does exist, however, to use the budget at the time of 
decision to build as baseline in studies that specifically seek to understand how well informed 
decision makers are in deciding whether to invest or not in large capital projects. This is the 
standard we refer to and use in our studies. It was originally laid down in Pickrell (1990), 
Fouracre et al. (1990), Walmsley and Pickett (1992), National Audit Office (1992), Leavitt et al. 
(1993), World Bank (1994), Nijkamp and Ubbels (1999), and Flyvbjerg et al. (2002). The 
standard has since been followed in dozens of other studies and is used by government in, e.g., 
the USA, China, the UK, Scandinavia, and The Netherlands to assess and estimate cost overrun.  
But nowhere do we claim that this is a general standard, because other baselines may be used 
for other purposes, as explained above, something Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui seem to overlook. 
Because we do not claim that the decision to build is a general standard, Love and Ahiaga-
Dagbui's Myth No. 2 (that we do) falls flat. It is irrelevant (see Table 1). 
 
[Table 1 app. here] 
 
                                                             
21 This point also mutes Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui's critique that, "the use of currency conversations [sic, 
we assume Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui mean "conversions"] has no meaning for comparing the costs of ǯ
consideration" (p. YY). Issues of purchasing power parity are relevant for comparing cost, we agree, but 
irrelevant for comparing percentage cost overrun, which is what we do. 
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2. Which Data Are Used to Establish Cost Overrun? 
When establishing cost overrun for a specific project type, typically a sample from a population 
of projects is used. The sample must properly reflect the population of projects for which one 
wants to measure cost overrun. All relevant projects, for which valid and reliable data are 
available, should be included in the sample. Any bias in the sample must be carefully considered. 
 
In statistical analysis, data are ideally a sample drawn from a larger population, and the sample 
represents the population properly. These requirements may be satisfied by drawing the sample 
by randomized lot. In studies of human affairs, however, in which controlled laboratory 
experiments often cannot be conducted, it is frequently impossible to meet these ideal 
conditions. So too for studies of cost overrun. One therefore has to take a different approach to 
sampling and statistical analysis in such studies. Good practice is to include all relevant capital 
projects for which valid and reliable data are available, so that no distributional information 
goes to waste. The latter is a crucial precondition for producing high-quality results, as argued 
by Kahneman (2011: 251), Lovallo and Kahneman (2003), Lovallo et al. (2012), and Flyvbjerg 
(2008, 2013a). Thus, the sampling criterion for good practice is data availability. However, this 
means that the sample will often not be representative of the population it is drawn from, 
because availability does not necessarily equate representativeness. It is therefore critical, as 
part of good practice, to carefully assess any biases arising from sampling in this manner. This is 
the approach taken to data collection in our research, from the first to the most recent studies, 
carefully described in each publication, including in Flyvbjerg et al. (2002: 294-295). 
 Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui write that the original sample of 258 transportation 
infrastructure projects in Flyvbjerg et al. (2002) Ȃ later included in larger datasets in Flyvbjerg 
et al. (2004), Cantarelli et al. (2012a,b,c), Ansar et al. (2017), and Flyvbjerg (2016) Ȃ "falls short 
of providing a statistically representative sample of the population" (p. YY).22 But the lack of 
representativeness is something we ourselves pointed out in the original study, in which Ȃ 
following the approach outlined above Ȃ we explicitly state: "the question is whether the 
projects included in the sample are representative of the population of transportation 
infrastructure projects ... There are four reasons why this is probably not the case" (Flyvbjerg et 
al. 2002: 294).23 Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui's restatement 16 years later is no contribution. We 
further established, in the original study and repeated it in later studies, that the lack of 
representativeness means there is a conservative bias in our data, i.e., cost overrun in the project 
population is likely to be higher than cost overrun in the sample,24 which Love and Ahiaga-
Dagbui fail to mention. 
                                                             
22 The original dataset in Flyvbjerg et al. (2002) was collected by Mette Skamris Holm and Bent Flyvbjerg; 
the larger dataset in Flyvbjerg et al. (2004) by Bent Flyvbjerg, Carsten Glenting, and Arne Rønnest; the 
dataset in Cantarelli et al. (2012a,b,c) by Chantal Cantarelli and Bent Flyvbjerg; the dataset in Ansar et al. 
(2017) by Atif Ansar, Bent Flyvbjerg, and Alexander Budzier; and the dataset in Flyvbjerg (2016) by Bent 
Flyvbjerg, Alexander Budzier, Chantal Cantarelli, and Atif Ansar. Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui (p. YY) say that 
ideally data should be made publicly available to allow for evaluation and reproduction of the results. We 
agree, but in practice sources often insist on non-disclosure agreements as a condition for making their 
data available for study. 
23 We repeated this in later studies, e.g., Cantarelli et al. (2012a: 3): "the current sample of 806 projects is 
probably not representative of the population of transport infrastructure projects ... The sample is biased 
and the bias is conservative." 
24 There a four reasons for this bias. First, that projects that are managed well with respect to data 
availability are likely to also be managed well in other respects, resulting in better than average 
performance. Second, it has been argued that the very existence of data that make the evaluation of 
performance possible may contribute to improved performance when such data are used by project 
management to monitor projects (World Bank 1994: 17). Third, managers of projects with a particularly 
bad track record regarding cost overrun may have an interest in not making cost data available, which 
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 Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui make an attempt at deciding sample size based on population 
size and they estimate that "the optimum sample size should have been 383," i.e., 125 projects 
more than our original sample, for the sample to be representative (p. YY). We respectfully 
disagree and see this as one of many statistical errors committed by Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui 
(for an overview of these errors, see Table 2). Population size does not matter, when the 
population is considerably larger than the sample size.25 E.g., an opinion poll for Iceland, with a 
population of 350,000, requires the same sample size as one for the USA, with a population of 
326 million. In fact, any sample size will do when significance has been shown, like in our 
studies, assuming the sampling and the calculations have been done properly. This means that 
our dataset has a size that is big enough to show what we have shown, with p-values less than 
0.05, and even 0.001 and smaller for our main results. In sum, saying that the sample size is too 
small when significance has actually been established indicates a fundamental 
misunderstanding of what statistics is. We will see more errors like this below. 
 We agree with Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui, however, that larger samples are desirable for 
the study of cost underestimation and overrun. This is why we have continued to enlarge and 
update the original dataset, to 806 projects in Cantarelli et al. (2012a) and 2,062 in Flyvbjerg 
(2016), now including both costs and benefits. The later studies show the original 2002 results 
to be robust across significantly more observations, more project types, more geographies, and a 
longer time span. So much for Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui's "debunking" of the 2002 study (p. YY): 
the original results have been replicated and confirmed with more and better data, which is a 
key scientific criterion for proving the validity and robustness of results. Even larger datasets 
are in the pipeline to test our conclusions further and to investigate new problematics. To be 
credible, Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui would have had to present datasets and studies showing 
different results from ours. They do not. Instead they postulate their debunking of our work. 
 We further contest Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui on the following points about the dataset. 
First, Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui claim we have been "cherry-picking data" (p. YY). This is a serious 
allegation. It would imply fraud on our part. But Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui provide no evidence to 
support the accusation. Moreover, the charge is easy to disprove, because from 2002 until today 
our sampling criterion has always been, and was always explicitly stated as: "all projects for 
which data were considered valid and reliable were included in the sample" (Flyvbjerg et al. 
2002: 294, Cantarelli et al. 2012a,b,c). "All" means all, so no cherry-picking would be possible 
without violating this criterion, which would also violate Kahneman's advice of including all 
distributional information. We take this piece of advice seriously, because it is key to the quality 
of our data and the accuracy of our forecasts. The burden of proof is on Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui 
to show where we violated our sampling criterion and cherry-picked data. If Love and Ahiaga-
Dagbui cannot show this, their accusation falls and all that is left is their loud rhetoric, here as 
elsewhere in their paper.  
 Second, according to Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui, we have "piggy-backed off the data 
collected and published by other researchers" (p. YY). This statement is another statistical error 
on the part of Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui. In statistics, using data from other studies is called meta-
                                                                                                                                                                                              
would then result in underrepresentation of such projects in the sample. Conversely, managers of projects 
with a good track record for cost might be interested in making this 
public, resulting in overrepresentation of these projects. Fourth, and finally, even where managers have 
made cost data available, they may have chosen to give out data that present their projects in as favorable 
a light as possible. Often there are several estimates of costs to choose from and several calculations of 
actual costs for a given project at a given time. Managers may decide to choose the combination of actual 
and estimated costs that suits them best, possibly a combination that makes their projects look good with 
a low cost overrun. 
25 This and any other statement about statistics in the present and previous papers have been formulated 
or verified by professional mathematical statisticians, who form part of the author team for our papers, 
including the present paper. 
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analysis, not piggy-backing, and it is considered best practice. Much of statistics would be 
impossible if combination of data from different sources was forbidden. We did meta-analysis, 
because it would be an error not to, as this would have left out relevant information from our 
studies (i.e., we would have cherry-picked).26 We explicitly acknowledge and cite the studies we 
draw on with full references (Flyvbjerg et al. 2002: 294). In short, we chose to stand on the 
shoulders of our colleagues to make a cumulative contribution to our field. What do Love and 
Ahiaga-Dagbui suggest as good practice, if not this? They do not answer this question. To be 
credible they would have to. 
 Third, Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui claim we have an "over-reliance on secondary sources" 
and that this "reaffirms the unreliable nature of the data" (p. YY). This is a further statistical 
error. In statistical meta-analysis one does not speak of "secondary sources," but of "other 
studies." Furthermore, to produce the most valid and reliable results one has to include all other 
studies with valid and reliable data. It is non-sensical to speak of "over-reliance." Sometimes 
"other studies" account for 100 percent of observations in meta-analyses, and even then no 
statistician would speak of "over-reliance." Finally, there is nothing unreliable about the studies 
we included. Others and we have established their reliability before we included them in our 
study, as is standard for meta-analyses. 
 Fourth, we stated in Flyvbjerg et al. (2002: 280, 293) and later papers (Cantarelli et al. 
2012a,b,c; Flyvbjerg 2016; Ansar et al. 2017) that, as far as we know, our dataset on cost 
overrun in large transportation infrastructure projects is the largest of its kind. We explained in 
these publications that this means largest among independent datasets that have been subject to 
academic peer review and can be considered to contain valid and reliable data suitable for 
scholarly research aimed at assessing cost overrun in the global population of large 
transportation infrastructure projects. Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui question our claim: "More 
reliable statistical studies using larger samples had been undertaken prior to Flyvbjerg et alǤǯ
(2002) study" (p. YY). As examples of such studies, Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui cite five studies of 
small highway projects in four US states, each sponsored by a state department for 
transportation (Thurgood et al. 1990, Hinze and Selstead 1991, Vidalis and Najafi 2002, Bordat 
et al. 2004, Ellis et al. 2007).27 Disregarding the fact that three of the five studies did not exist 
when Flyvbjerg et al. (2002) was written, and that one of the remaining two (Thurgood et al. 
1990) in fact has a smaller sample, none of the five studies is comparable to Flyvbjerg et al. 
(2002) for the reasons listed below. 
 Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui claim that Thurgood et al. (1990), "examined the cost overruns 
of 817 highway projects delivered by the Utah Department of Transportation between 1980 and 
1989" (p. YY).28 The authors misread Thurgood et al. (1990: 122), however, who explicitly 
write, "The final sample size was 106 projects," which is less than half the size of our smallest 
sample on cost overrun. Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui seem to confuse the universe that Thurgood et 
al. drew their sample from (which consists of 817 projects) with the sample itself, which is yet 
another statistical error. Measured in dollar-value, our sample is in fact 708 times larger than 
Thurgood et al.'s, because they focus on small projects, as we will see below, while we focus on 
large ones. 
                                                             
26 Typically, we had access to the datasets we included in meta-analysis. We critically studied the data and 
research methodology behind each dataset to establish whether the data could be considered valid and 
reliable. Data that were considered not valid and reliable were rejected. 
27 We have earlier considered these studies, and more, for inclusion in our meta-analyses of cost overrun. 
Our standard procedure is that each time a new study is published we assess validity, reliability, and 
comparability of its data. If the data are valid, reliable, and comparable with ours (same baseline, constant 
prices, etc.) then we include the data for meta-analysis. If not, we reject the data. For the 2002 study, we 
considered all studies existing at the time. Below, we present what we found when we assessed validity, 
reliability, and comparability of the studies cited by Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui.  
28 The correct period is 1980 to 1988, not 1980 to 1989 as Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui wrongly claim. 
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 But this is not Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui's worst misunderstanding regarding the five 
studies. None of the studies is comparable to ours, irrespective of sample size. The studies are 
not even comparable to each other, as we will see. The comparison that Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui 
make is false for the following reasons: 
 
(a) The five studies cover highway projects in each of four US states only.29 Our studies cover 
highways, freeways, bridges, tunnels, urban heavy rail, urban light rail, conventional inter-
city rail, and high-speed rail in 20 nations on five continents.30 For this reason alone the five 
US studies are not comparable to our global study. None of the five studies aims to 
understand cost overrun in the global population of large transportation infrastructure 
projects, nor do they claim to, as opposed to Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui, who misrepresent the 
studies in making this claim when they say the studies are comparable to ours. Each of the 
five studies claims only to say something about the population of highway projects in the 
individual state studied. It is not surprising that specific geographies, like individual US 
states, have overruns that are different from global averages. It is to be expected and is also 
the case for specific geographies within our global sample, as we show in Cantarelli et al. 
(2012c), where we deal with heterogeneity and country bias. Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui make 
the error of comparing datasets that have been selected and studied with fundamentally 
different purposes. 
(b) The five US studies cover only very small projects, each costing one or a few million dollars 
on average, whereas we study large transportation infrastructure projects with an average 
cost of $349 million.31 To claim, without evidence, that studies of projects with an average 
size of one or a few million dollars are directly comparable to studies of projects costing 
hundreds of millions of dollars is a postulate with no credible foundation. Again, for this 
reason alone the five US studies are not comparable to our study.32 
(c) Thurgood et al. (1990: 122) deliberately sampled for "unusually large overruns," because 
they wanted to explain such overruns, with a view to helping their client, the Utah 
Department of Transportation, getting large overruns under control.33 This means that 
                                                             
29 Thurgood et al. (1990) studied highways specifically with the Utah Department of Transportation, 
Hinze and Selstead (1991) the Washington State Department of Transportation, Vidalis and Najafi (2002) 
the Florida Department of Transportation, Bordat et al. (2004) the Indiana Department of Transportation, 
and Ellis et al. (2007) again the Florida Department of Transportation. The studies were sponsored by the 
individual departments of transportation with the purpose of curbing cost overrun within their respective 
jurisdictions. 
30 This is for the 2002 study. Our later studies with larger samples (Cantarelli et al. 2012a,b,c; Flyvbjerg 
2016; and Ansar et al. 2017) cover more project types and nations. 
31 The average project size of Thurgood et al. (1990: 122-123) is $1.2 million; Hinze and Selstead (1991: 
27-18) $1 to 2 million, of which 67 percent of projects are smaller than $1 million; Vidalis and Najafi 
(2002: 2) $2.7 million; Bordat et al. (2004: 55) approximately $1 million, of which 76 percent are smaller 
than $1 million, and finally Ellis et al. (2007: 19) $4.8 million in average project size. (There are small 
differences in the price level in which the average costs are given in the five studies, but nothing that 
changes the main conclusion). 
32 We also include some smaller projects in our samples for comparison purposes, i.e., to study the effect 
of size on project performance (Flyvbjerg et al. 2004). This entails including project size as a covariate in 
statistical modeling and checking for dependence on other covariates, which might be different for 
different sizes of project. For Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui to directly compare large international projects 
with small US state projects without such statistical modeling demonstrates an inept understanding of 
statistics. 
33 In full, Thurgood et al. (1990: 122, emphasis added) stipulate that their final sample of 106 projects 
"included All projects with unusually large overruns ($100,000 or larger), All projects carried out by 
contractors with an unusually high percentage of contracts with large overruns, All projects supervised by 
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Thurgood et al.'s sample is deliberately and openly biased, something Love and Ahiaga-
Dagbui fail to mention, and something that again makes the sample not comparable with 
ours, or with other studies, including the other four US highways studies cited by Love and 
Ahiaga-Dagbui. It is misrepresentation, deliberate or not, on the part of Love and Ahiaga-
Dagbui to fail to mention this bias and to present Thurgood et al.'s study as if it may be 
compared to other studies.34 
(d) Similarly, Vidalis and Najafi (2002: 2) deliberately biased their sample by focusing only on 
"projects that had experienced cost and time overruns," because this was the problem they 
and their client, the Florida Department of Transportation, wanted to solve. In comparison, 
our sample, and most other academic samples, contain projects with both overrun and 
underrun to ensure that all relevant distributional information is included. Again this 
difference means that sampling for the Vidalis and Najafi study is idiosyncratic and cannot 
be compared with other studies, including ours and all other studies mentioned in this 
paper. Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui fail to mention this important fact and thus misrepresent 
Vidalis and Najafi (2002). 
(e) The baseline for measuring cost overrun in all five US highway studies is the budget at 
contracting. This baseline was chosen because the authors and their clients wanted to 
understand how to better control contract costs in each of the states that commissioned the 
studies. Our baseline is the budget at the decision to build, because we want to understand 
whether decision makers are well informed about cost when they give the green light to 
projects. Both baselines are legitimate, as mentioned, but they focus on very different 
problematics, again making the five studies not comparable with ours.35 
(f) With the five studies, Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui mix studies that arrive at their conclusions by 
studying samples of projects (e.g., Thurgood et al. 1990) with studies that arrive at their 
conclusions by studying whole populations of projects (e.g., Ellis at al. 2007), without 
making this clear to readers.36 This is yet another statistical error. For valid and reliable 
conclusions, it would have been necessary for Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui to distinguish 
between the two types of study, because how analysis is done and results interpreted are 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
project engineers with an unusually high percentage of projects with large overruns, and A 10 percent 
random sample of the remaining projects." 
34 The idiosyncratic sampling of Thurgood et al. (1990) demonstrate statistical ineptitude similar to that 
of Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui. It is impossible to attribute causes reliably with no normal projects acting as 
controls. Thurgood et al. should have included the whole range of projects in their analysis if they wanted 
to identify reasons why some projects have unusually large overruns. Their sampling is therefore not so 
such much biased as it is incompetent, and adding a 10 percent random sample of "remaining projects" 
does not solve the problem. This comment also pertains to Vidalis and Najafi (2002), covered under the 
next point. 
35 It should also be mentioned that some of the five studies, e.g., Bordat et al. (2004), study cost overrun 
on contracts instead of cost overrun on projects. The two are typically not the same, because a project is 
normally made up of several contracts. It is not always clear in the five studies chosen by Love and Ahiaga-
Dagbui when contracts are used instead of projects, which undermines the validity, reliability, and 
comparability of results. Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui must be faulted for making no mention of this. In any 
case, it again makes the results not comparable with ours, which are based on the study of projects, not 
contracts. 
36 For instance, Ellis at al. (2007: 17) studied populations of projects, which they describe in the following 
manner: "All completed projects from January 1998 to March 2006 were included in the search, which 
totaled 3130 projects. Of this total, 1160 projects were alternative contracting projects. The collected 
project data was initially reviewed to identify any obviously erroneous data. After the data cleaning 
process, a total of 3040 FDOT construction project data were used for analysis. The final dataset consisted 
of 1132 projects using alternative contracting methods and 1908 projects using traditional design-bid-
build contracting methods." In contrast, Thurgood et al. (1990) studied a sample of projects, as described 
above. 
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different for studies of samples versus studies of whole populations. Love and Ahiaga-
Dagbui again fail to mention this issue. 
(g) Finally, none of the five studies are independent academic research, nor are they presented 
as such by their authors. The studies were all commissioned by individual state departments 
for transportation to understand and curb their specific problems with contractor cost 
overrun. The studies are therefore more akin to consulting, with the issues of validity, 
reliability, and comparability this raises. That is not a critique of the studies as such. They 
may have served their purposes. But the studies do not meet the criteria of academic 
research without independent verification, and such verification has not happened, to our 
knowledge. It is misrepresentation on the part of Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui to present the five 
studies as if they are directly comparable to scholarly research, including ours. 
 
In sum, each of the points above show the five cited studies do not have the same goals as ours 
and are not comparable with ours. Taken together, the points form a devastating verdict on Love 
and Ahiaga-Dagbui's claim that the studies are relevant in the current context, including for 
comparing sample sizes and statistical analysis. Our claim stands that our dataset is the "largest 
of its kind," i.e., the largest of academic datasets aimed at understanding cost overrun in the 
worldwide population of large transportation infrastructure projects. Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui's 
Myth No. 1 is therefore not a myth, but a fact (see Table 1). 
 
[Table 2 app. here] 
 
3. What Is the Size and Frequency of Cost Overrun? 
Studies of cost overrun in large capital investment projects show: (a) Overrun is typically 
significantly more frequent than underrun; (b) Average and median overrun are typically 
positive and significantly different from zero; and (c) Average overrun is typically higher than 
median overrun, indicating fat upper tails. 
 
Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui take issue with the results of our research in the following manner: "A 
never-ending factoid ... is that 9 out of 10 transport projects worldwide experience cost 
overruns. Despite the unrepresentative nature of the sample, many academics have and 
continue to [sic] peddle this canard. For example, Shane et al" (p. YY). To be precise, our data 
show that 86 percent of transportation infrastructure projects have cost overrun, here rounded 
up to nine out of ten. Other studies confirm frequencies of this order of magnitude, some of them 
even higher, e.g., Dantata et al. (2006), Federal Transit Administration (2003, 2008), Lee (2008), 
Pickrell (1990), and Riksrevisionsverket (1994). We dealt with the representativeness of our 
sample above and argued that it is conservative, i.e., the real frequency of overrun in the project 
population is probably higher than the 86 percent found for the sample. Interestingly, Peter 
Love himself, in one of his main studies, found data to support this claim, with a frequency of 
cost overrun of 95 percent in a sample of 58 Australian transportation infrastructure projects 
(Love et al. 2012: 147).37 On that background, we are at a loss to understand Love and Ahiaga-
Dagbui's complaint about our 86 percent. To call this number a canard, as Love and Ahiaga-
Dagbui do, is an insult to ducks and would require Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui to prove it wrong by 
presenting better data than ours, and different from Love's own data. Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui 
                                                             
37 Figure 2 in Love et al. (2012: 147) shows that three of 58 projects in their sample have cost underrun. 
The remaining 55 projects, equivalent to 95 percent, have cost overrun. It should be mentioned that 
overrun for these projects was baselined at contracting, which, other things being equal, should result in a 
lower frequency of overrun than found in our studies, which are baselined at the decision to build, i.e., 
earlier in the project cycle, leaving more time for project to accumulate overrun. This makes Love et al.'s 
finding of 95 percent conservative, compared to our finding, lending further support to our claim that 
overruns by far outnumber underruns. 
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do no such thing, they simply postulate their critique in non-credible contrast to Love's own 
findings. To criticize Shane et al. on that basis is not only wrong, but unfair. Shane et al., like 
many others, simply cite the best available data in the research literature. 
 In an attempt to support their point, Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui quote a study from the 
Grattan Institute, an Australian think tank, which states that, "The majority of [Australian 
transportation infrastructure] projects come in close to their announced costs" (Terrill and 
Danks 2016: 10). However, closer examination of this study and its data proves this to be an 
exceedingly selective and dubious quote, even if, theoretically, it is possible, of course, that 
Australian infrastructure projects differ significantly from the rest of the world. 
 First, Terrill and Danks (2016:11) make the following unusual assumption about the 
majority of projects they studied: 
 
"For the 68 per cent of projects where data on their early costs is missing in our 
dataset, we have made the assumption that no early cost overruns occurred."38 
 
This is idiosyncratic sampling again. Our data indicate that for many projects the largest cost 
overruns occur in the early stages of the project cycle, so to assume zero cost overrun here is to 
assume away a major part of overrun (Cantarelli et al. 2012b). In our dataset, projects with such 
missing data are excluded to ensure valid and reliable results, which means that our data and 
results are not comparable to those of Terrill and Danks, who have the good grace to mention 
that their assumption means that the cost overruns in their report "may well be understated" 
and,  "Cost overruns may be even bigger than we claim" (p. 11). Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui, 
engaging once more in misrepresentation, make no mention of this admission. 
 Second, if the Grattan Institute researchers found no public evidence of a cost overrun on 
a project they assumed that the project came in on budget. Their report hereby commit the 
fallacy of assuming that absence of evidence is evidence of absence, a no go for anyone who 
understands statistics. We do not accept absence of evidence as evidence in our studies. If we do 
not find evidence that a project actually came in on budget we do not include the project as a 
data point. The Grattan Institute study may therefore not be compared to our studies, or, indeed, 
any other study. 
 Third, Terrill and Danks main measure of cost overrun is baselined "after principal 
contracts have been awarded" (Terrill et al. 2016: 8). We measure cost overrun from the date of 
decision to build, which for large projects may be years earlier than contract award. Both 
baselines are legitimate, as said, depending on what you want to measure, but the different 
baselines mean that our results are not comparable with those of Terrill and Danks. 
 Fourth, Terrill and Danks use two different datasets in their analysis. One consists of 51 
projects for which they themselves manually collected the data. According to this dataset, 65 
percent of projects had cost overrun (compared with 86 percent for our data) with an average 
cost overrun of 52 percent (compared with 28 percent for our data). Thus, using their own data, 
the Grattan Institute study found a larger average cost overrun than us and indication of a clear 
skew in overrun, like us, something one would never know from reading Love and Ahiaga-
Dagbui's selective use of results from the study. 
 Fifth, the other dataset used by Terrill and Danks consists of 542 projects from a 
database owned by a consultancy, from which data were collected electronically (Terrill et al. 
2016: 5, 8). The majority of Terrill and Danks's findings are based on this second dataset, 
according to which 34 percent of projects had cost overrun and average cost overrun was 24 
percent. From long experience working in and with consultancies, we know they typically do not 
                                                             
38 The Grattan Institute study suffers from several similar assumptions and shortcuts that negatively 
affect the quality of data and analyses. The explanation may be that the study was rushed. It was carried 
out in just a few months, which is short for a study of this magnitude, with all the quality control of data 
points and analyses that are needed for producing valid and reliable findings. 
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have the time it takes to establish the level of validity and reliability required for peer-reviewed 
scholarly research, nor is this their purpose. Sometimes consultancies also have a tendency to 
find what their clients like to see, because it is good for business.39 For this reason alone, we 
would reject the consultancy data, given that they have not been independently verified. 
 Sixth, and perhaps most importantly, Terrill and Danks (2016: 64) decided to remove 56 
outliers from the consultancy dataset in an arbitrary and unaccounted for manner. Removal of 
outliers is justified only if they come from a different population of uncertainty than non-
outlying observations, for instance due to erroneous measurements or experimenter bias. 
Blanket removal of outliers is a mistake Ȃ and a big one, when outliers are big as they are for cost 
overrun in capital investment projects (Steele and Huber 2004). Removal of outliers before 
analysis is like trying to understand how best to earthquake proof buildings without taking the 
biggest earthquakes into account Ȃ not a good idea. Specifically, Terrill and Danks removed 
projects from the consultancy dataset if they had a cost overrun higher than the highest overrun 
in the smaller dataset of 51 projects mentioned above. This is an unusual way to define and 
eliminate outliers, which will not be found in any statistics textbook. Moreover, 56 outliers out of 
a total of 542 observations Ȃ more than ten percent Ȃ is simply not credible as a measurement 
error. Terrill and Danks did not so much remove outliers, as they artificially removed a real 
skew in their data. By so doing, they artificially lowered the frequency, average, median, and 
variance of cost overrun, which is exactly the opposite of what you want to do if your aim is valid 
and reliable data and analyses. Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui do not mention this, again 
misrepresenting the study. 
 When the Grattan Institute study came out in 2016, like for all such studies, we reviewed 
the data for possible inclusion in our meta-analyses. However, after carefully assessing the 
dataset, including discussions with Grattan Institute staff, we decided against inclusion, for the 
reasons listed above: the dataset is of insufficient quality and arbitrary assumptions have been 
made that make it not comparable to other datasets and not suitable for statistical analyses. It is 
troubling that Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui base their paper on this type of data, resulting in 
misleading conclusions. 
 Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui criticize David Uren, the Economics Editor of The Australian, for 
citing our results, and for assuming that the results derive from megaprojects, i.e., projects 
larger than $1 billion. But if you read Uren, you will see that when he quotes our numbers he 
explicitly refers to "major rail projects" and not megaprojects, which is a correct reference that 
includes projects smaller than megaprojects. To criticize Uren on this point is therefore again 
both wrong and unfair. Furthermore, Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui criticize Uren for saying that 
"projects with greater cost overruns deliver a benefit shortfall" (p. YY), which Love and Ahiaga-
Dagbui believe (without proof) to be an untrue statement. But Uren says no such thing Ȃ true or 
not Ȃ and neither do we. Uren correctly quotes Flyvbjerg (2009: 344) for saying, "The projects 
that are made to look best on paper are the projects that amass the highest cost overruns and Ǥǳ
projects with greater cost overruns would deliver a benefit shortfall, as Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui 
imply. The critique of Uren is therefore misguided. 
 In sum, Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui present no valid and reliable data to counter our finding 
that 86 percent of large transportation infrastructure investments have cost overrun. Their 
Myth no. 3 (that our finding is a myth) therefore falls and our finding stands, until such a time 
that someone presents data to falsify it (see Table 1). Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui also do not 
present data to counter our finding that average cost overrun in large transportation 
infrastructure projects is 28 percent in real terms. In fact, the numbers Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui 
present support this finding, or perhaps even a number somewhat higher than this. 
 
                                                             
39 This is why, when accuracy really counts, many consultancies use our data instead of their own. 
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4. What Are the Root Causes of Cost Overrun? 
Your biggest risk is you, according to behavioral science. The root cause of cost overrun is 
human bias, psychological and political. Scope changes, complexity, geology, archaeology, bad 
weather, business cycles, etc. are causes, but not root causes. If you don't solve the problem of 
cost overrun at the root, you will not end overrun. 
 
Recent developments in behavioral science are causing Kuhnian paradigm shifts in many fields, 
including project management and forecasting. Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui are on the wrong side of 
this shift. Incredibly, they ignore 30 to 40 years of research in behavioral science, including the 
Nobel-Prize-winning work of Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman on heuristics and biases 
(Tversky and Kahneman 1974, Gilovich et al. 2002, Kahneman 2011). There is not one reference 
or mention of this work in Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui's paper. As long as cost estimation for large 
transportation infrastructure projects does not take into account the revolutionary results of 
behavioral science Ȃ i.e., as long as cost estimation is understood and practiced in the manner 
described by Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui Ȃ planners and managers will keep getting cost wrong. 
This is the most fundamental problem with Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui's approach.  
 Instead of accepting the Kuhnian revolution of behavioral science, Love and Ahiaga-
Dagbui propose what they call an "evolutionist" approach to understanding cost overrun, which 
emphasizes "changes in scope" and "complexity in complex decisions [sic]" as main causes of 
overrun (p. YY). Behavioral scientists would agree that scope changes and complexity are 
relevant to understanding what goes on in capital investment projects, but would not see them 
as root causes of cost overrun. The root cause of cost overrun, according to behavioral science, is 
the well-documented fact that planners and managers keep underestimating scope changes and 
complexity in project after project.  
 From the point of view of behavioral science, the mechanisms of scope changes, complex 
interfaces, archaeology, geology, bad weather, business cycles, etc. are not unknown to planners 
of capital projects, just as it is not unknown to planners that such mechanisms may be mitigated, 
for instance by reference class forecasting (see below). However, planners often underestimate 
these mechanisms and mitigation measures, due to overconfidence bias, the planning fallacy, 
and strategic misrepresentation. In behavioral terms, scope changes etc. are manifestations of 
such underestimation on the part of planners, and it is in this sense that bias and 
underestimation are the root causes of cost overrun. But because scope changes etc. are more 
visible than the underlying root causes, they are often mistaken for the cause of cost overrun. In 
behavioral terms, the causal chain starts with human bias which leads to underestimation of 
scope during planning which leads to unaccounted for scope changes during delivery which lead 
to cost overrun. Scope changes are an intermediate stage in this causal chain through which the 
root causes manifest themselves. With behavioral science we say to planners, "Your biggest risk 
is you." It is not scope changes, complexity, etc. in themselves that are the main problem; it is 
how human beings misconceive and underestimate these phenomena, through overconfidence 
bias, the planning fallacy, etc. This is a profound and proven insight that behavioral science 
brings to capital investment planning. 
 Behavioral science entails a change of perspective: The problem with cost overrun is not 
error but bias, and as long as you try to solve the problem as something it is not (error), you will 
not solve it. Estimates and decisions need to be de-biased, which is fundamentally different from 
eliminating error (Kahneman et al. 2011, Flyvbjerg 2008, 2013a). Furthermore, the problem is 
not even cost overrun, it is cost underestimation. Overrun is a consequence of underestimation, 
with the latter happening upstream from overrun, often years before overruns manifest. Again, 
if you try to solve the problem as something it is not (cost overrun), you will fail. You need to 
solve the problem of cost underestimation to solve the problem of cost overrun. Until you 
understand these basic insights from behavioral science, you're unlikely to get capital 
investments right, including cost estimates. Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui clearly do not understand 
this. 
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 In particular, Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui criticize our use of the terms "delusion" and 
"deception" (Flyvbjerg et al. 2009, Cantarelli et al. 2010a), fools and liars (Flyvbjerg 2013a), and 
error and lying (Flyvbjerg et al. 2002) to describe forecasting and forecasters. They say, for 
example, that our use of the terms fools and liars is "intentionally crafted to be provocative and 
controversial, has no scientific merit and has been simply contrived to gain attention" (p. YY). 
Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui have no way, of course, to know what our intentions are. But worse, 
they fail to mention that the terms fool and liar are not ours but those of Nassim Nicholas Taleb, 
although we clearly state this in the work Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui cite, by including the 
following verbatim quote from Taleb (2010: 163, emphasis added): 
 ǲǥǮ ?ǡǯ
their forecast is ineffectual, are not what I would call ethical. What they do is no 
dǮ ?Ǥǯ
by forecasting should be treated as either a fool or a liar. Some forecasters cause Ǥǳ40 
 
Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui further fail to mention that we use the terms "delusion" and 
"deception," etc. in an academically precise manner referring to well-established bodies of 
theory, with people suffering from delusion explicitly defined as those "who are subject to 
'optimism bias' and the 'planning fallacy'," whereas people operating by means of deception are 
defined as "those practicing 'strategic misrepresentation,' 'agency,' and the 'conspiracy of 
optimism'" (Flyvbjerg 2013a: 772).41 We see these terms as analytically sharp and as highly 
communicative concepts that help us understand and reframe what is going on in forecasting, 
and how to improve its outcomes. That is why we use the terms. We agree with Love and 
Ahiaga-Dagbui that more explanations of cost overrun exist than delusion and deception, and we 
discuss these in Cantarelli et al. (2010a). We maintain, however, that explanations are not born 
equal and that root causes are more important than causes in understanding and curbing 
overrun. 
 Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui further claim, again falsely, that, "No evidence at all supports 
the causal claims of delusion and deception" (p. YY). Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui here conveniently 
disregard a body of scholarship that runs from Wachs (1989, 1990) over Kain (1990) and 
Pickrell (1990) to Flyvbjerg et al. (2004), Flyvbjerg et al. (2009), and Cantarelli et al. (2010a), 
which demonstrates that deception contributes to cost underestimation. For an example in their 
own backyard, we suggest Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui study the history of the Sydney Opera House, 
which was built on lies causing a cost overrun of 1,400 percent, as we show in Flyvbjerg et al. 
(2009) and Flyvbjerg (2005). There is a reason why Martin Wachs, one of the most respected 
and trusted scholars in the field, called his classic paper on the topic "When Planners Lie with 
Numbers" (Wachs 1989, emphasis added).42 Unlike Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui, Wachs, Flyvbjerg, 
Glenting, Rønnest, and more have made the effort to actually interview forecasters about 
delusion and deception. Wachs reported that in case after case, forecasters told him they had 
                                                             
40 Recently, for the first time, transportation forecasters have been treated as criminals in a number of 
lawsuits in Australia and the USA over misleading forecasts (Dezember and Glazer 2013, Evans 2010, Hals 
2013, Miller 2013, Rubin 2017, Saulwick 2014, Singh 2017, Worthington 2012, Wright 2014). This has 
sent shock waves through the international forecasting community. 
41 Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui question that there is a rational motive for actors, including forecasters, to lie 
in project planning and management. In doing so they ignore a strong body of work in economics and 
management, namely principal-agent theory, which has established exactly this: that lying is often rational 
in decision making and creates moral hazard. 
42 Full disclosure: Martin Wachs was Bent Flyvbjerg's supervisor when he was a doctoral student at the 
University of California, Los Angeles. Flyvbjerg also gave the first Annual Martin Wachs Distinguished 
Lecture at UC Berkeley in 2006. 
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had to "revise" their forecasts many times because they failed to satisfy their superiors. The 
forecasts had to be "cooked" in order to produce numbers that were suitable to getting projects 
started. The following is ǯO? ? ? ? ?ǣ ? ? ?-145) interviews: 
 
"a planner admitted to me that he had reluctantly but repeatedly adjusted the 
patronage figures upward, and the cost figures downward to satisfy a local elected 
official who 
wanted to compete successfully for a federal grant. Ironically, and to the chagrin of 
that 
planner, when the project was later built, and the patronage proved lower and the 
costs 
higher than the published estimates, the same local politician was asked by the 
press to ǤǯǡǮǯǢ
rely on the forecasts made by our staff, and they seem to have made a big mistake ǯǤ ? 
 
Wachs (1986: 28, 1990: 146) talks of "nearly universal abuse" of forecasting in this manner. 
Flyvbjerg et al. (2004: 44) were able to replicate Wachs's results more than a decade later with 
different data, further confirming the theories of deception. The following planner is typical of 
how respondents explained the basic mechanism of cost underestimation: 
 
"You will often as a planner know the real costs. You know that the budget is too 
low but it is difficult to pass such a message to the counsellors [politicians] and the 
private actors. They know that high costs reduce the chances of national funding." 
 
Experienced professionals like the interviewed planner know that outturn costs will be higher 
than estimated costs due to scope changes, complex interfaces, archaeology, geology, bad 
weather, business cycles, etc., but because of political pressure to secure funding for projects 
they hold back this knowledge, which is seen as detrimental to the objective of obtaining 
funding. 
 Wachs (2013: 112), who pioneered research on deception in transportation 
infrastructure forecasting, recently summed up more than 25 years of scholarship in the 
following manner, in stark contrast to Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui: 
 
"While some scholars believe this [i.e., misleading forecasts] is a simple technical 
matter involving the tools and techniques of cost estimation and patronage 
forecasting, there is growing evidence that the gaps between forecasts and 
outcomes are the results of deliberate misrepresentation and thus amount to a 
collective failure of professional ethics." 
 
Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui may dislike research results like these, because they identify members 
of their profession as unethical. It is deeply troubling, however, that people who call themselves 
scholars would choose to simply ignore the research and postulate a different reality from that 
documented by it.43 It reveals a selective approach to evidence that is similar to data picking, i.e., 
the selection of information to falsely obtain the conclusions one wants. 
 We further observe that if the inaccuracy of cost estimates were simply a matter of 
incomplete information and honest errors regarding scope and complexity, as Love and Ahiaga-
Dagbui maintain, then one would expect cost inaccuracies to be random or close to random, with 
overestimates occurring about as frequently as underestimates. We explicitly tested this thesis 
                                                             
43 For other examples of such denial, see Flyvbjerg (2013b, 2015). 
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and falsified it at an overwhelmingly high level of statistical significance (p < 0.001) (Flyvbjerg 
et al. 2002: 286Ȃ287). Instead, cost inaccuracies have a striking systemic bias, with 
underestimates being significantly more common than overestimates, as demonstrated by our 
studies and those of others as we saw above. Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui provide no data to 
support their claim that cost estimates suffer from error and not bias. They are even 
contradicted on this point by their own studies (Love et al. 2012). In the face of such self-
contradictory evidence Ȃ and confronted with well-documented phenomena like the planning 
fallacy and overconfidence bias Ȃ to postulate randomness in cost underestimation, like Love 
and Ahiaga-Dagbui do, is misrepresentation, and denial, in the extreme. 
 Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui argue that our talk of delusion and deception, error or lie, and 
fools and liars in forecasting, "presents the reader with a false dichotomy; an either/or choice 
that is practically invalid," in their words (p. YY). Again this is a misreading on the part of Love 
and Ahiaga-Dagbui. We never claimed that delusion and deception and error and lie cannot 
occur simultaneously in the same project, so there is no dichotomy. In fact, Flyvbjerg et al. 
(2009: 180) explicitly emphasize a both/and, in saying, "Delusion and deception are 
complementary rather than alternative explanations."  
 Finally, Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui offer the influence of procurement methods as an 
alternative to our explanations of cost overrun. They write that, "Flyvbjerg et al. ... have not 
considered or acknowledged the influence of procurement methods and other project practices 
that can have on [sic] large-scale transport infrastructures [sic] projects outturn costs" (p. YY). 
This is factually incorrect. Flyvbjerg et al. (2004) and Cantarelli and Flyvbjerg (2015) compared 
procurement in public-private partnership projects, projects under state-owned enterprises, 
and conventional public sector projects in a study that produced statistically significant results 
regarding procurement types. In comparison, Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui arbitrarily present 
numbers without statistical analysis and scientific validity. We agree with Love and Ahiaga-
Dagbui that the influence of procurement methods on cost overrun is an interesting area for 
further research and we have several more such studies in the pipeline. However, (a) the studies 
must be substantially more rigorous than what Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui present and (b) we see 
no indication in existing results that choice of procurement method may be considered a root 
cause of cost overrun, but only a cause, as per our distinction above. 
 In sum, Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui designate as myth our explanation of cost overrun in 
terms of psychological and political bias. Instead, they explain cost overrun in terms of errors 
caused by scope changes and complexity. We have on our side (a) Nobel-Prize-winning theory 
on heuristics and biases that show planners will systematically underestimate cost resulting in 
cost overrun, and (b) principal-agent theory, which shows that lying about cost can be rational 
and is often incentivized in decision making. Even better, we have high-quality data that fit the 
two sets of theory at an overwhelmingly high level of statistical significance (p < 0.001), and we 
have planners stating on the record that they deliberately underestimated costs to have projects 
approved and funded, establishing the causal link between deception and cost underestimation 
that Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui say does not exist. In comparison, Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui offer 
their untested "evolutionist" theory that (a) does not fit existing data Ȃ ours or that of others Ȃ 
because according to the theory inaccuracies in cost estimates would be more or less random, 
but in reality they are systemically biased, and (b) has resulted in unsuccessful mitigation and 
containment strategies, according to Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui themselves (see below).  
 As the evidence stands, Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui's Myth No. 4 (that explanations in terms 
of bias are a myth) falls and our explanation stands, because it is better supported both 
theoretically and empirically (see Table 1). If you want to get cost estimates right, you need to 
unlearn key parts of conventional cost estimation, with its century-long record of getting 
estimates wrong. Instead you need to learn behavioral science, because behavior is the main 
problem, not artefacts. 
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5. How Is Cost Overrun Best Avoided? 
Cost overrun is best avoided by (a) Getting the front-end of capital investments right, including 
using reference class forecasting or similar methods to establish reliable, de-biased estimates of 
cost that fit the client's risk appetite, (b) Establishing an incentive structure that encourages all 
involved to stay on budget, and (c) Hiring a delivery team with a proven track record for the 
specific type of capital investment in question. 
 
Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui admit that the conventional strategies to curb cost overrun have failed, 
when they write "While considerable inroads have been made by the evolutionists to explain 
cost overrun ... the mitigation and containment strategies that have been developed to combat 
this phenomenon have fallen short of their intended goal" (p. YY). We agree, but given this 
admission of failure for conventional strategies, we find it difficult to understand Love and 
Ahiaga-Dagbui's animosity toward alternatives, including reference class forecasting, which has 
been documented to produce better outcomes. 
 Data accumulated over the past two to three decades show with overwhelming 
statistical significance that it is not the fact that budgets are wrong that needs explaining, but the 
fact that the vast majority of budgets are wrong in the same direction, namely underestimation. 
Our data go back 86 years and for that period the bias in cost forecasting has been constant. 
Forecasters are "predictably irrational" in the words of Ariely (2009). Taking this known and 
highly predictable bias into account in forecasting is the single most important thing planners 
and managers can do to de-bias forecasts and make them more accurate, as pointed out by 
Kahneman (2011), Lovallo and Kahneman (2003), and Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Several 
governments and corporations are already doing this, including in the USA, China, Britain, 
Scandinavia, and Switzerland. However, as long as people like Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui keep 
conceiving of the forecasting problem in terms of error instead of bias they block this insight and 
the improvement in forecasting accuracy it would bring. 
 Nowhere is Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui's misconstrual of the forecasting problematic Ȃ and 
their limited understanding of statistics and behavioral science Ȃ expressed more clearly than in 
their comments on reference class forecasting (RCF), a method originally proposed by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) to de-bias predictions along the lines described above. Love and 
Ahiaga-Dagbui write about RCF, "To simply assume that a given project is comparable to past 
and completed projects and that a lump sum up-lift could be added to account for all 
uncertainties is a gross oversimplification of reality" (p. YY). We agree it is a simplification, like 
any forecast will be. But Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui overlook the fact that this simplification has 
been documented to produce better estimates on average than any other simplification 
(Kahneman and Lovallo 1993, Batselier and Vanhoucke 2016, Chang et al. 2016, and Awojobi 
and Jenkins 2016). "All models are wrong, but some are useful," as famously said by Box (1979: 
202). We see RCF as useful, because it results in better forecasting accuracy than the models of 
conventional cost estimation, which we see as wrong, because they produce not only error but 
systemic bias. 
 In contrast, Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui claim that by coming up with a less simplified and 
more detailed account of costs they can better the results of RCF. "[A]s information becomes 
available the reliability of an estimate improves," they state as a general principle, equating 
more information with more detail (p. YY). Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui provide no proof of their 
claim, which is understandable because proof does not exist Ȃ quite the opposite. It may sound 
intuitively right that more detail would lead to higher accuracy, but ǯ
razor and formal work on statistical model selection (Akaike 1970, Akaike 1998, Box et al. 2015, 
Lee 1973, Krugman 2000, Smith 1997, Stoica and Söderström 1982, Tukey 1961) and human 
decision making (Czerlinski et al. 1999, Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011, Marewski et al. 2010), 
which demonstrates that when two models fit the data the simpler one is generally more 
accurate. Box (1976: 792) elegantly sums up the situation: "Just as the ability to devise simple 
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but evocative models is the signature of the great scientist so overelaboration and 
overparameterization is often the mark of mediocrity." 
 Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui's claim is similar to believing you can beat the basic odds of a 
Las Vegas casino by a more detailed understanding of how gambling works. You cannot. By 
taking an outside view, rather than a more detailed inside view that invites optimism, RCF gives 
you the basic odds of cost estimation, and on average you will be better off sticking to these odds 
than anything else you can think up. This is plausibly argued by behavioral science and 
empirically documented by Batselier (2016), Batselier and Vanhoucke (2017), Bordley (2014), 
Kim et al. (2011), Liu and Napier (2010), and Liu et al. (2010). 
 Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui further claim that, "The production of an estimate demands 
knowledge of what will occur ... The acquisition of such knowledge is dependent upon the 
completeness of the information made available" (p. YY). Again this claim is wrong and it 
conveys a deterministic type of thinking we would have thought extinct in academia after the 
probabilistic revolution has shown that nothing is deterministic in nature. The claim that we 
must know "what will occur" to make an estimate is akin to insisting on understanding the 
world in terms of Newtonian physics after quantum mechanics, something you would not get 
away with in physics, but something Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui apparently think still goes in their 
field. You do not need to know what will occur, nor do you need "completeness of ... 
information," to make high-quality forecasts. You need to know the odds of what may occur, and 
RCF provides those odds. As long as Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui insist on producing their more 
detailed forecasts, based on conventional cost estimation, they will continue to produce inferior 
forecasts.44 
 We understand that our line of argument may be unsettling for Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui, 
because it shows that much of what they do can be bettered by simpler and theoretically 
sounder methods. But such is innovation in cost estimation today. Accept it and you may 
prosper; deny it and you will be left irrelevant. However, conventional cost estimation and RCF 
need not be at loggerheads. We have developed an approach in which they supplement each 
other, with RCF correcting the biases of the conventional approach, which contributes a useful 
breakdown of project components needed for effective delivery. This supplementary approach 
has been applied in practice on dozens, if not hundreds, of projects and is described in Flyvbjerg 
et al. (2004), Flyvbjerg (2008), Flyvbjerg et al. (2009), Flyvbjerg et al. (2014), Batselier (2016), 
and Batselier and Vanhoucke (2017). We encourage readers, and especially conventional cost 
engineers, to try out this combined approach on their next projects and see the difference it 
makes to accuracy. 
 Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui claim that "Reference Class Forecasting ... utilizes a Normal 
distribution" (p. YY, emphasis and caps in original). This is factually wrong. RCF uses the 
empirical distribution in the reference class, whatever it is. For large infrastructure projects, 
typically the distribution is not normal but asymmetrical and fat-tailed. 
 In addition, Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui write that "it is more appropriate to use the median 
rather than the mean, which Flyvbjerg (2008) utilizes when applying RCF" (p. YY) . This is 
factually wrong again. First, the median and the mean may both be used by forecasters, 
depending on what level of certainty they wish to achieve for their forecast, as explained in 
Flyvbjerg (2008). The median, also called the P50, is used by forecasters who are willing to 
accept a fifty-fifty risk of cost overrun. The mean is used by portfolio managers, because in this 
case projects in the portfolio that go over budget will be balanced by projects that go under. For 
distributions with a fat upper tail, like cost overrun, the mean will be significantly higher than 
                                                             
44 Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui also claim that, "as design process [sic] become [sic] digitized, enabled by 
Building Information Modelling [BIM], cost estimates will improve" (p. YY). We say, do not hold your 
breath. BIM has been around for 25 years, and although examples exist of effective use of BIM results have 
in general been disappointing. It will take fundamental disruption beyond BIM to bring the construction 
industry into the Digital Age, in our judgment. 
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the median, so using one instead of the other will significantly influence the risks accepted by 
the forecast. Specifically, using the median, as Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui recommend, would 
significantly underestimate risk, incurring risks higher than those accepted by portfolio 
managers. Second, when clients manage just one or a few projects, which is typical for 
megaprojects, they are often more risk averse than portfolio managers. In this case neither 
median nor mean is used in RCF, but higher P-values, often the P80, which indicates 80 percent 
certainty of staying within budget and 20 percent risk of going over (Flyvbjerg 2008: 13). In 
sum, we do not use the mean in RCF, we use the value that corresponds to clients' risk appetite, 
and the client decides. For the very large projects we typically work with, this mostly 
corresponds to the more conservative P80-value, but if clients are even more conservative than 
this, a higher P-value is used. So far the highest P-value we have used in practical RCF is the P95. 
 Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui further write that "an estimate for a large infrastructure project 
should include the estimated uncertainty measured by the relative standard deviation" (p. YY). 
Again this is wrong and Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui here contradict themselves. Above we saw they 
argue that the mean is not a good summary measure for risk distributions. But standard 
deviations are linked to the mean, so to be against means but for standard deviations as 
measures of uncertainty is inconsistent and constitutes yet another statistical error on the part 
of Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui. More fundamentally, distributions of cost overrun for large 
infrastructure projects are asymmetrical and fat-tailed, as said. For such distributions the 
standard deviation is not a good measure of uncertainty. The standard deviation 
underrepresents fat tails and gives the impression that distributions are symmetric, i.e., that 
overruns and underruns around the central value are equally likely, which is not the case for 
large infrastructure projects. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) advocate instead presentation of 
the full distributional information as the preferred and most transparent option, which is what 
we do when we do RCFs (Flyvbjerg et al. 2004, Flyvbjerg et al. 2014). Aimed at people like Love 
and Ahiaga-Dagbui, Taleb (2014: 535) observes that the standard deviation "does more harm 
than good Ȃ particularly with the growing class of people ... mechanistically applying statistical 
tools to scientific problems." Taleb recommends the use of the median absolute deviation as a 
more robust measure of variability. In any case, no one familiar with the actual distribution of 
cost overrun in large infrastructure projects would recommend the standard deviation as a 
measure of uncertainty. The fact that Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui, and similar-minded forecasters, 
advocate and use this measure helps explain why they keep getting cost estimates wrong. 
 In their perhaps most blatant demonstration of statistical ineptitude, Love and Ahiaga-
Dagbui talk about "fitting ... data to the distribution" (p. YY). Somebody who knows statistics 
would never write like this. From a statistician's point of view data are immutable and can 
therefore not be meddled with in the manner suggested by Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui. 
Distributions are fitted to the data, or a mathematical transformation of them, not the other way 
around.45 
 As a final point regarding RCF, Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui cite the Edinburgh Tram as "[a]n 
example where RCF was applied and an inappropriate distribution used" (p. YY). This is wrong. 
First, the cost overrun distribution used for the first Edinburgh Tram RCF reflects the historical 
data for all comparable projects for which data were available at the time of doing this RCF, as 
                                                             
45 Here Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui also claim, "The Flyvbjerg et al. (2002) study simply relies on a Normal 
distribution information [sic] in their dataset and measures of p-values to reach the sweeping conclusions 
made" (p. YY). Again this is wrong. Anyone caring to read the study would see we use non-parametric 
methods where normality cannot be assumed. Moreover, if Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui understood the 
Central Limit Theorem, they would know that (a) even if individual measurements (here cost overrun) do 
not come from a normal distribution, the average of many measurements will tend to follow normality 
with good approximation, and (b) this justifies using normality in many statistical tests. 
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the theory of RCF says it must.46 Second, Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui indicate that the Edinburgh 
Tram RCF was in error because actual cost was higher than that forecasted by the RCF. This is a 
naive interpretation of RCF, which again reveals Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui's deterministic bent 
and lack of understanding of uncertainty. Even a P80 forecast (80 percent chance of staying 
within budget), like that initially used for the Edinburgh Tram, has a risk of overrun, namely 20 
percent. This means that one in five times the forecast will be exceeded, which, then, should 
come as no surprise when it happens and does not invalidate the approach of estimation, as 
Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui indicate. Third, although the Edinburgh Tram planners did initially 
adopt an RCF approach they later turned away from this and back to a fully conventional 
approach imbued with optimism and inaccuracy (Flyvbjerg and Budzier 2018). Finally, Love and 
Ahiaga-Dagbui confuse the numbers they cite for the Edinburgh Tram by comparing monetary 
values that (a) are not given in the same year's prices, and (b) cover different cost items, 
undermining their conclusions. It is unsettling to see supposedly experienced cost engineers 
make such basic mistakes of comparing apples and oranges. For up-to-date and consistent 
numbers on the Edinburgh Tram, see Flyvbjerg and Budzier (2018).47 In sum, if we ever saw an 
example of optimism bias and a project that would have benefitted from a consistent RCF, the 
Edinburgh Tram is it. You do not have to take our word for it. Read the Edinburgh Tram 
Inquiry.48 
 Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui rightly say evidence should decide truth claims. Today, a dozen 
independent evaluations exist with evidence that supports the accuracy of RCF over other 
estimation methods, for large and small projects alike (Chang et al. 2016, Awojobi and Jenkins 
2016, Batselier 2016, Batselier and Vanhoucke 2017, Bordley 2014, Kim et al. 2011, Liu and 
Napier 2010, and Liu et al. 2010). Here is the conclusion from one such evaluation, covering 
construction projects:  
 
"The conducted evaluation is entirely based on real-life project data and shows 
that RCF indeed performs best, for both cost and time forecasting, and therefore 
supports the practical relevance of the techniqueǳO?Batselier and Vanhoucke 2016: 
36). 
 
Conclusions: Good and Bad Practice 
Above we refuted, one by one, Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui's four myths about cost overrun, 
summarized in Table 1. Table 3 shows good and bad practice in understanding and curbing cost 
overrun in large capital investment projects. We argued above that Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui's 
paper epitomizes bad practice. We contrasted this with good practice, which we spelled out in 
terms of how to best understand and curb cost overrun. Good practice entails: 
 
1. Consistent definition and measurement of overrun, as actual cost in percent (or ratio) of 
estimated cost, with cost measured in the local currency, constant prices, and against a 
congruent baseline; in contrast to Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui who inconsistently mix and 
compare studies with different baselines and price levels. 
2. Data collection that includes all observations of overrun that are valid, reliable, and 
comparable; as opposed to Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui who include in their paper non-valid 
data from consultancies, idiosyncratically sampled data that do not compare to other data, 
data with arbitrarily removed outliers, data that mix population and sample, data from 
                                                             
46 The reference class and cost overrun distribution used for the first Edinburgh Tram RCF was developed 
by Flyvbjerg, Glenting, and Rønnest in collaboration with the UK Department for Transport. 
47 Flyvbjerg and Budzier (2018) was written as part of Flyvbjerg serving as expert witness for the 
Edinburgh Tram Inquiry. 
48 Proceedings from the Edinburgh Tram Inquiry may be found at http://www.edinburghtraminquiry.org. 
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populations that do not compare, data from small and big projects, and data based on 
different baselines, rendering their arguments invalid.  
3. Acknowledgment that cost overrun is fat-tailed with a significant overincidence of overrun 
to underrun, indicating substantial upper tail risk; in contrast to Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui 
who ignore or underplay the systemic bias in cost overrun and talk of overrun in terms of 
error and randomness, against all evidence, consequently underestimating cost risk. 
4. Acknowledgment that the root cause of cost overrun is human bias, which leads to 
underestimation of scope during planning which leads to scope changes during delivery 
which lead to cost overrun; as opposed to Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui who dismiss the findings 
of behavioral science as "fake news" and explain overrun in technical terms, directly caused 
by scope changes and complexity. 
5. De-biasing estimates of cost by using reference class forecasting or similar methods that 
build on behavioral science; in contrast to Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui who use conventional 
methods with a century-long track record of inaccuracy and systemic bias. But conventional 
methods and RCF need not be at loggerheads. RCF may be used to correct the biases of the 
conventional approach, which in turn contributes a useful breakdown of project components 
needed for effective delivery. We recommend this combined approach, which has a 
documented track record of high accuracy. 
 
[Table 3 app. here] 
 
In addition to being exemplars of bad practice for understanding and curbing cost overrun, Love 
and Ahiaga-Dagbui misrepresent our work in their futile attempts at discrediting behavioral 
explanations of overrun. We have countered the worst misrepresentations above. Alone and 
taken together the misrepresentations constitute a fabricated version of our findings, either (a) 
by presenting direct falsehoods, as when Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui claim we cherry-pick data for 
our studies when in fact we include all valid and reliable data, making data-picking impossible, 
or (b) through omissions, as when they postulate that no evidence has demonstrated that 
deception contributes to cost underestimation when in fact Wachs (1989, 1990), Flyvbjerg et al. 
(2004), and Flyvbjerg (2005) document such evidence. The fabricated version of our work has 
little semblance with the actual work and in several cases stands in direct opposition to it, for 
instance, when Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui claim that reference class forecasting utilizes a normal 
distribution, when in fact it uses the empirical distribution of the reference class of projects, 
which is typically fat-tailed. 
 Nevertheless, we appreciate Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui's acknowledgment of the impact of 
our work and the opportunity to clarify what good and bad practice is regarding cost overrun. 
We understand their aversion to the behavioral revolution. After all, it leaves obsolete key parts 
of what they know and do. That is normal for Kuhnian paradigm shifts. We encourage Love and 
Ahiaga-Dagbui to get on the right side of the behavioral shift and face up to what the data show: 
cost overrun is systemic, not random; bias is the problem, not error; behavior is the issue, not 
artefacts. 
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Table 1: Reality check for Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui's four postulated myths 
Postulated myth Reality 
Myth no. 1: The sample is the largest of its kind and the 
first statistically significant study of cost escalation. 
Flyvbjerg et al. (2002) claimed their sample was the 
largest of its kind, i.e., the largest of academic datasets 
aimed at understanding cost overrun in the worldwide 
population of large transportation infrastructure 
projects. Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui present five studies of 
small US highway projects as evidence that larger 
samples with statistical analyses existed. However, three 
of the five studies did not exist when Flyvbjerg et al. 
(2002) was written; one of the remaining two has a 
smaller sample. Moreover, none of the five studies are 
comparable to Flyvbjerg et al. (2002), because (a) they 
are not aimed at understanding cost overrun in the 
worldwide population of large transportation 
infrastructure projects, (b) they are baselined differently, 
and (c) their data are not valid. Flyvbjerg et al.'s claim 
therefore stands. 
Myth no. 2: Using the budget at decision to build as 
baseline to determine cost underestimation is an 
international standard. 
We do not claim that using the decision to build as 
baseline is a general standard. Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui's 
Myth No. 2 (that we do) therefore falls. Choice of baseline 
depends on what you want to measure. If, like us, you 
want to measure how well informed decision makers are 
when deciding to invest in large capital projects, then the 
decision to build is the right baseline. If, like Love and 
Ahiaga-Dagbui, you want to measure how well 
contractors deliver to their bid, then contracting is the 
right baseline. One baseline does not fit all purposes, as 
Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui seem to think.  
Myth no. 3: Costs are underestimated in nine out of 10 
transportation infrastructure projects. 
Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui present no valid and reliable 
data to counter Flyvbjerg et al.'s (2002) finding that 86 
percent of large transportation infrastructure 
investments have cost overrun. Other studies confirm 
this finding, including one by Peter Love himself, which 
found a frequency of cost overrun of 95 percent (Love et 
al. 2012: 147). Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui's Myth no. 3 (that 
our finding is a myth) therefore falls and our finding 
stands. 
Myth no. 4: Underestimation cannot be explained by 
error and is best explained by strategic 
misrepresentation, that is, lying. 
We maintain that cost overrun is best explained in terms 
of psychological and political biases with planners. Love 
and Ahiaga-Dagbui explain cost overrun in terms of 
errors caused by scope changes and complexity. We have 
on our side (a) Nobel-Prize-winning theory on heuristics 
and biases, (b) principal-agent theory, (c) high-quality 
data that fit the two sets of theory at an overwhelmingly 
high level of statistical significance (p < 0.001), and (d) 
planners stating on the record that they deliberately 
underestimated costs to have projects approved and 
funded, establishing the causal link between deception 
and cost underestimation that Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui 
claim does not exist. In comparison, Love and Ahiaga-
Dagbui offer their untested "evolutionist" theory that (a) 
does not fit the data, because according to the theory 
inaccuracies in cost estimates would be random, but in 
reality they are systemically biased, and (b) has resulted 
in unsuccessful mitigation and containment strategies, 
according to Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui themselves. As the 
evidence stands, Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui's Myth No. 4 
(that explanations in terms of bias are a myth) falls and 
our explanation stands, because it is better supported 
both theoretically and empirically. 
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Table 2: Overview of statistical errors in Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui (2018). Each error is 
documented and explained in the main text. 
No. Statistical error 
1 Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui attempt to calculate sample size based on population size, but population size 
does not matter when the population is considerably larger than the sample. They get the sample size 
wrong. 
2 They say our sample size is too small, despite the fact that we establish overwhelmingly high levels of 
statistical significance for our main results (p<0.001). Saying the sample size is too small when significance 
has been established shows a fundamental misunderstanding of statistics. 
3 They criticize statistical meta-analysis for "piggy-backing" off data collected by others and for "over-
reliance on secondary sources," which shows a cardinal misunderstanding of what statistical meta-analysis 
is. Best practice in meta-analysis is to use all available data, including data from other studies. 
4 They confuse the sample with the universe from which the sample was drawn, thus misinterpreting the 
sample size in Thurgood et al. (1990) as being 817 when in fact it is 106. 
5 They erroneously compare studies aimed at understanding fundamentally different populations, 
demonstrating lack of understanding of what a statistical population is and which populations may be 
compared. 
6 They erroneously claim that studies of small projects are directly comparable to studies of large projects. 
7 Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui mix up and compare studies that arrive at their conclusions by studying samples 
of projects with studies that arrive at their conclusions by studying whole populations of projects. 
8 They mix up and compare studies that use different baselines in measuring costs, especially the budget at 
contracting with the budget at the decision to build, committing the age-old error of comparing apples and 
oranges. 
9 They compare our studies with studies that are fundamentally and obviously flawed, e.g., a study that 
leaves out 56 outliers, rendering this study meaningless, and studies only looking at large cost overruns. 
10 Their mistaken comments on the use of normal distributions in statistical tests demonstrate ignorance of  
the Central Limit Theorem, which is key to understanding such tests. 
11 They claim that the production of an estimate "demands knowledge of what will occur." This is a 
deterministic fallacy. It demonstrates a lack of understanding of uncertainty and statistical estimation. For 
statistical estimation you do not need to know what will occur. You need to know the odds of what may 
occur. With the right data statistical analysis gives you these odds. 
12 They seem to regard the standard deviation as generally independent of the mean, when that is only so for 
the special case of normal distributions, which rarely applies to cost overrun. 
13 They recommend measuring uncertainty by the standard deviation. But distributions of cost overrun for 
large infrastructure projects are fat-tailed, and for such distributions the standard deviation is not a good 
measure of uncertainty. 
14 Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui talk about "fitting ... data to the distribution," which makes no sense at all in 
statistics where data are immutable and distributions are fitted to the data, or a mathematical 
transformation of them, not the other way around. 
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Table 3: Good and bad practice for understanding and curbing cost overrun. 
 Good Practice Bad Practice 
1. Definition and 
measurement 
Cost overrun is defined as actual cost in 
percent (or ratio) of estimated cost, with 
cost measured in the local currency, constant 
prices, and against a consistent baseline. 
 
The baseline must reflect what you want to 
measure, e.g., whether (a) the decision to 
build was well informed, or (b) contractors 
deliver to their budget.  
Treating overruns as comparable that are not 
because overrun was inconsistently defined and 
measured, e.g., mix of baselines, price levels, or 
currencies, which is common. 
 
Inconsistencies regarding baselines etc. make it 
misleading to compare overrun across project 
types, organizations, geographies, historical 
periods, etc. 
2. Data All comparable observations of overrun for 
which valid and reliable data are available 
should be included, so that no distributional 
information goes to waste. 
 
Observations may constitute the whole 
population, or they may be from a sample, 
which should be large enough to 
demonstrate statistical significance. 
 
Possible biases arising from sampling must 
be carefully assessed, including their impact 
on results. 
"Garbage in, garbage out," as a result of: ȈIncluding idiosyncratically sampled data Ȉ ȈMixing data based on different baselines Ȉ-quality data from consultancies Ȉonfusing population and sample Ȉ
populations ȈAssuming larger populations require larger 
samples ȈThinking meta-analysis constitutes "piggy-
backing" ȈAssuming data from secondary sources are less 
valuable than primary data. 
3. Size and 
frequency 
High-quality studies baselined at the 
decision to build show: Ȉof projects have overrun ȈAverage and median overrun are positive 
and significantly different from zero, with 
substantial variation between investment 
types ȈThe distribution of overruns is fat-tailed to 
the right. 
 
ȈBasing results on bad data (see above) Ȉ	ssuming error and randomness for 
results that are systemically biased Ȉ ȈDenying or dismissing results because you don't 
like them Ȉ results that are not 
comparable. 
4. Root causes Your biggest risk is you, says behavioral 
science. Cost overrun is not caused by error, 
but by bias, psychological and political. As 
long as you try to solve the problem of 
overrun as an error, you will not succeed. 
Cost overrun is not even the problem. Cost 
underestimation is. 
Endlessly repeating the fallacy that cost overrun 
is an error caused by scope changes, complexity, 
geology, etc. 
 
Disregarding, deliberately or not, scholarship in 
behavioral science, including on optimism and 
moral hazard. 
5. Solutions De-biasing estimates of cost by using 
reference class forecasting or similar 
methods that build on behavioral science. 
Endlessly producing inaccurate and systemically 
biased forecasts using conventional cost 
estimation. 
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